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A B S T R A C T  A R T I C L E   I N F O 
In this paper we investigate the short term abnormal return to the bidding 
firm’s shareholders in takeover transactions in Finland during the time 
period from January 2000 to December 2013. Specific features of the 
market for corporate acquisitions in Finland are that almost all of the 
transactions are friendly acquisitions and usually aim for 100 % of the target 
company. We estimate the abnormal return around 314 individual takeover 
announcements and investigate determinants of the abnormal returns. Our 
results show that the takeover announcement on average yields a positive 
abnormal return to the bidding firm’s shareholders, thus, support the value 
creating hypothesis. The announcement effect on the announcement day is 
1.4 % and statistically significant. Both pre-event and post-event abnormal 
returns are statistically insignificant, although there is sign of a negative 
revaluation in the post-event period. Among the takeover characteristics, 
we document a significant impact on the bidder’s abnormal return on the 
announcement day for small deals yielding a higher abnormal return, but a 
positive relationship between the announcement effect and the relative size 
of the deal, cross-border deals giving a smaller abnormal return, and 
indication of diversification deals giving a higher abnormal return to the 
bidder’s shareholders. 
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Corporate acquisition is a fast way for a company to grow compared to organic growth. Most bidding 
companies motivate this way to grow by the potential synergies that the acquisition creates, hence, one 
should expect the acquisition not only to create growth but also to create value for the acquiring firm’s 
shareholders. However, empirical evidence from the takeover market report that bidding firm’s 
shareholders mostly earn small and insignificant returns, while target firm’s shareholders earn large and 
significant returns in takeover transactions.1 The returns are heavily skewed in favor of the target firm also 
after adjusting for differences in firm size. Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) reported a 90/10 split of the 
                                               
1 For an overview of the wealth effects of takeover transactions, see, e.g., Jensen and Ruback (1983), Jarrell, Brickley 
and Netter (1988), Agrawal and Jaffe (2000), Bruner (2004), and Martynova and Renneboog (2008). 
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value-weighted takeover gain in their US sample, while Högfeldt and Högholm (2000) observed a similar 
distribution in a sample of Swedish takeovers. 
Several hypotheses have emerged trying to explain these empirical findings. Some suggest that takeovers 
do create value, but that the target firm’s shareholders for some reason obtain a larger share of the gain. 
Grossman and Hart’s (1980) free riding problem is one explanation. In the extreme case the free riding 
hypothesis suggests that target shareholders capture the entire gain. Alternatively, e.g., competition among 
bidders (Fishman (1980)), takeover defense measures (Harris (1990)), or target ownership structure 
(Högfeldt and Högholm (2000)) may also explain the skewed distribution in favor of the target firm’s 
shareholders. 
Another line of thought suggests that takeovers do not create any additional value, but is more of a 
redistribution of wealth from shareholders in the bidding firm to shareholders in the target firm. Hence, 
takeovers occur because of management incentives or mistakes, i.e., takeovers occur because management 
of bidding firms wishes to grow (e.g., Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990)), or they overestimate the value 
of the target firm (e.g., Roll (1986)). Alternatively, the management of the bidding firm takes advantage of 
a temporary misvaluation of the firm, hence, taking advantage of a window of opportunity to make an 
acquisition (e.g., Jensen (2004)).  
The purpose of this study is to investigate the short-term abnormal return to the bidding firm’s shareholders 
in takeover transactions made by Finnish stock market listed companies during the time period from January 
2000 to December 2013. To our knowledge there are very few studies looking at the Finnish takeover 
market, and none looking at the market during the last 15 years. Specific features of the market for corporate 
acquisitions in Finland are that almost all of the transactions are friendly acquisitions and usually aim for 
100 % of the target company. We estimate the abnormal return around 314 individual takeover 
announcements and investigate determinants of the abnormal returns. Our results show that the takeover 
announcement on average yields a positive abnormal return to the bidding firm’s shareholders, thus, support 
the value creating hypothesis. The announcement effect on the announcement day is 1.4 % and statistically 
significant. Both pre-event and post-event abnormal returns are statistically insignificant, although there is 
sign of a negative revaluation in the post-event period. Among the takeover characteristics, we document a 
significant impact on the bidder’s abnormal return on the announcement day for small deals yielding a 
higher abnormal return, but a positive relationship between the announcement effect and the relative size 
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of the deal, cross-border deals giving a smaller abnormal return, and an indication of diversification deals 
giving a higher abnormal return to the bidder’s shareholders. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the literature review on the 
motivations for takeovers and the determinants of the share price reaction to the takeover announcement. 
Section 3 describes the methodology and the data, while the empirical results are presented in Section 4. 
Section 5 concludes the study. 
2. MOTIVES FOR TAKEOVERS 
Three major takeover motives have been advanced in the literature implying gains for both the bidder and 
the target, or negative return to the bidder. These are the synergy motive, the agency motive and the hubris 
hypothesis. 
The synergy motive assumes that managers maximize shareholders’ wealth and would engage in takeover 
activities only if it results in gains to the shareholders. Among the synergy motives, the first set of motives 
is consistent with the assumption that additional value is created by takeovers. The second set of motives 
cast doubt on whether any additional value is created by takeovers, or if the resulting gains to shareholders’ 
is at the expense of other stakeholders (e.g., employees, customers, suppliers, tax payers). 
According to the inefficient management motive, more efficient firms will acquire less efficient firms and 
realize gains by improving their efficiency; this implies excess managerial capabilities in the acquiring firm 
(e.g., Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988)). The operating synergy motive postulates, e.g., economics of scale 
and that takeovers help achieve levels of activities at which they can be obtained (e.g., Williamson (1975)). 
The financial synergy motive hypothesizes complementaries between merging firms, not in managerial 
capabilities, but in the availability of investment opportunities and internal cash flows. A merged firm will 
have lower cost of capital due to lower cost of internal funds as well as possible risk reduction, savings in 
flotation costs, and improvements in capital allocation (e.g., Levy and Sarnat (1970), Galai and Masulis 
(1976), Prescott and Visscher (1980)). 
The theory of strategic alignment to changing environments motivates takeovers to take place as a response 
to environmental changes. External acquisitions of needed capabilities allow firms to adapt more quickly 
to changes, than by developing capabilities internally (e.g., Summer (1980)). The undervaluation theory 
states that takeovers occur when the market value of the target firm for some reason does not reflect its true 
or potential value, or its value in the hands of an alternative management. Firms can acquire assets for 
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expansion more cheaply by buying the stock of existing firms than by buying or building the assets, when 
the target's stock price is below the replacement cost of its assets (e.g., Chappell and Cheng (1984)). In line 
with the undervaluation hypothesis, the information or signaling theory attempts to explain why target 
shares seem to be permanently revalued upward in a takeover whether or not it is successful. The 
information hypothesis states that the takeover sends a signal to the market that the target shares are 
undervalued, or alternatively, the offer signals information to target management which inspires them to 
implement a more efficient strategy on their own (e.g., Dodd and Ruback (1977), Bradley, Desai and Kim 
(1988)). 
All of the above presented motives suggest that additional value is created in takeovers. The remaining 
three motives argue that the gains accruing to target and bidder shareholders are merely wealth 
redistribution from other stakeholders in the respective firms. The market power hypothesis states that 
shareholder's wealth increases at the expense of customers (or suppliers), due to increased concentration 
leading to collusion and monopoly effects (e.g., Eckbo (1992)). Redistribution of wealth is also the case if 
takeovers are motivated by tax considerations. In this case, shareholders gain at the expense of tax payers 
(e.g., Auerbach and Reishaus (1987)). Finally, according to the redistribution hypothesis, shareholders’ 
gain can also accrue from bondholders due to unexpectedly increased leverage (e.g., Dennis and McConnel 
(1986)), or from employees, who are deprived of their benefits (e.g., Shleifer and Summers (1988)). 
According to the synergy motives, there should always be a positive gain in takeovers for all shareholders, 
stemming from efficiency improvements or from other stakeholders. Therefore, it follows that the measured 
gain to both target and bidder shareholders is expected to be positive. The division of the gain between 
target firm and acquiring firm shareholders may, though, not be equally distributed, but may be skewed in 
favor of the target due to a number of reasons. Grossman and Hart (1980) argue that due to potential free 
riding by the target firm's atomistic shareholders, the smallest tender offer price the shareholders will accept 
is the full improvement value after a successful takeover by the bidder. Hence, the extreme case of the free 
riding problem suggests that the target captures the entire gain, and consequently, there is no incentive to 
make takeover bids at all. Fishman (1988), among others, offers bidder competition as one reason for a 
larger target share of the takeover gain. On the other hand, Harris (1990) argues that takeover defense 
measures, taken by the target firm's management, force the bidder to pay out a large share of the gain to 
target shareholders. Another reason for a larger target share of the gain is an upward-sloping supply curve 
as a result of heterogeneity in beliefs and differences in tax status, as suggested by, e.g., Stulz, Walking and 
Song (1990). Finally, one line of thought suggests that if the target has some bargaining power, mainly 
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because it can resist the bidder, target shareholders may be able to extract a larger fraction of the takeover 
gain in an explicit or implicit negotiation with the bidder (e.g., Israel (1992), Högfeldt and Högholm 
(2000)). 
According to the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Jensen (1986)) it has been suggested that 
some takeovers are primarily motivated by the self-interest of the acquirer management. Several reasons 
have been advanced to explain this divergence. Among them are diversification of management's personal 
portfolio (Amihud and Lev (1981), use of free cash flow to increase the size of the firm (Jensen (1986)), 
and acquiring assets that increase the firm's dependence on the management ((Shleifer and Vishny (1989)). 
The basic idea in most of these explanations is that acquisitions result in an extraction of value from the 
acquirer shareholders by acquirer management.  
The important aspect of the above argument is that the target firm has been identified by the acquirer 
management as one that is most suited to increase its own welfare. Therefore, target shareholders, realizing 
their value to the acquirer management, will attempt to obtain some of this value. To the extent that target 
shareholders have some bargaining power, they will succeed in doing so, and the value they obtain will 
increase with the amount that the acquirer management can appropriate. Therefore, the more severe the 
agency problem, the higher is the target’s gain. Since greater appropriation by acquirer management also 
results in lower (or a negative) total gain, the observed gain to acquirer shareholder's should be small 
(compared to target shareholder's gain) or negative. 
Roll (1986) hypothesizes that managers commit errors of over optimism in evaluating takeover 
opportunities due to excessive pride or hubris. Hence, the takeover premium is a random error, a mistake 
by the bidder. The hubris hypothesis assumes market efficiency. Stock prices reflect all information; 
redeployment of productive resources cannot bring gains, and management cannot be improved through 
reshuffling or combinations across firms. Roll (1986) claims that the hubris hypothesis thus serves as a 
benchmark for comparison and is the null hypothesis against which other hypotheses should be compared. 
Further, the hypothesis does not require conscious pursuit of self-interest by managers. Managers may have 
good intentions, but can make mistakes in judgment. 
Since the takeover gain, according to the hubris hypothesis, is presumed to be close to zero, the payment to 
target shareholders represents a transfer between the target and the acquirer. It follows that the higher the 
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target gain, the lower the bidder gain, and that the total gain is close to zero (e.g., Berkovitch and Narayanan 
(1993), Malmendier and Tate (2005)). 
2.1. The effect of deal characteristics on bidder gains 
All of the above presented motives suggest that target shareholders experience a gain in takeovers. On the 
basis of the presented motives, however, the effect for the acquirer firm’s shareholders is not clear. This is 
also evident in the presented empirical results across different stock markets, where some find positive, 
some negative and some insignificant bidder returns. The takeover literature has also shown that the 
characteristics of the deal will affect takeover returns, and, hence, the gain to the shareholders.2  
The size of the target company may affect the bidder’s gain. The larger the target company, the larger a 
potential synergy gain to be split among the parties. However, the larger the target company, the better its 
negotiation power, and the more difficult the post-integration process. The empirical evidence regarding 
the relationship is mixed. Kane (2000) and Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) argue that large 
transactions result in value creation for the shareholders. On the other hand, Bradley and Sundaram (2004) 
show that the announcement effect is more negative with increased target size. As argued by Hansen (1987), 
a possible revaluation loss will be larger for the bidder the larger the target company. Al-Sharkas (2003) 
and Travlos (1987) show a negative correlation between bidder abnormal return and relative size. Likewise, 
Tang (2015) show that acquisitions of small targets generate a larger gain than a combination of similar 
sized firms. On the other hand, e.g., Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983), show that the bidder’s gain 
increases with the relative size of the target company to the bidder. In this paper we measure the size of the 
target with the value of the transaction. The relative size is defined as the transaction value to the book 
value of the bidder prior to the announcement (according to the last quarterly report preceding the 
announcement).  
Cross-border takeovers may open up an opportunity for the bidder to exploit market imperfections and to 
expand their business into new, international markets (e.g., Moeller and Schlingemann (2005)). Since these 
effects are unavailable in domestic takeovers, one may expect a higher wealth effect in cross-border deals. 
Martynova and Renneboog (2008b) argue that takeover gains may be caused by improvements in 
                                               
2 For an overview of the empirical evidence, see, e.g., Jensen and Ruback (1983), Agrawal and Jaffe (2000), Bruner 
(2004), Martynova and Renneboog (2008a). 
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governance of the bidder and the target firm. However, if there are large institutional differences in the 
bidder’s and the target’s countries, there may also be difficulties in the post-takeover process to utilize the 
perceived synergies. If the market anticipates such difficulties it may discount the expected gain. Conn, 
Cosh, Geust and Hughes (2005) and Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) present evidence consistent with 
this hypothesis. Mixed results are documented with respect to cross-border acquisitions. However, we 
expect to find a more positive announcement effect to a cross-border deal. Moeller and Schlingemann 
(2005) also find a larger positive bidder return if the target is originated in a country with a legal 
environment offering good shareholder protection. Hence, we also expect a larger positive bidder return for 
transactions where the target firm is from the US or the UK. 
Conglomerate takeovers (diversification) may create operational and financial synergies, which may lower 
the financial risk, and, hence, the probability that the company goes bankrupt. This may also lower the cost 
of debt for the company (Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992)). Diversification is also associated with a 
number of disadvantages stemming from the agency problem between managers and shareholders (e.g., 
Doukas, Holmen and Travos (2002), Schafstein and Stein (2000)), which may lead to lower takeover returns 
to bidders engaging in conglomerate takeovers. Mixed results have been documented for the value creation 
to the bidder’s shareholders in conglomerate acquisitions. We expect, however, a more positive 
announcement response to a focused takeover compared to an announcement of a conglomerate takeover. 
The legal status of the target company may also affect the takeover gain. A takeover involving a privately 
held target company may result in a higher return to the bidder’s shareholders than a corresponding 
transaction involving a publicly traded target company (e.g., Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004), 
Faccio, McConnell and Stolin (2006)). One reason can be a required illiquidity premium, another that the 
bidder may have a better negotiation power buying a private company compared to launching a public 
tender offer. The probability of the bid to succeed is also higher in a private transaction. However, buying 
a private firm can also be considered being more risky, since there is less information available about the 
target firm. We expect a more positive announcement effect in a takeover transaction involving a privately 
held target company. 
Martynova and Renneboog (2009) suggest that the method of payment may affect the short term market 
reaction to a takeover announcement. All cash bids are expected to generate a higher return to the 
shareholders than all-equity bids. The explanation is that asymmetric information implies that the bidder 
uses shares as a mean of payment when the share is overvalued, and uses cash when it is undervalued 
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(Myers and Majluf (1984)). Several studies have confirmed that the market reaction to announcements of 
equity offerings is significantly negative (e.g., Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004), Moeller and 
Schlingemann (2005), Martynova and Renneboog (2011)). In line with previous studies we expect a more 
positive announcement effect when the bid is an all-cash offering. 
Partial acquisitions (acquisition of less than 100 percent of the target equity) may lead to a higher 
announcement day return to the bidder than acquisitions aiming for full control. The bidder may use partial 
acquisitions as an instrument to transfer wealth from the target’s minority shareholders to themselves by, 
e.g., using pyramid control chains (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2002)). This value 
extraction is expected to occur more frequently in countries where the minority shareholders are less 
protected.3   
 
 
3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
We study the short-term announcement effect to the bidder’s shareholders and investigate several factors 
that may affect the stock market reaction to the takeover announcement. We measure the announcement 
effect as the sum of the daily average abnormal returns4 (CAAR) over different windows around the 
announcement day5, with a total event window of 41 days, 20 days prior to and 20 days after the event day. 
We also study alternative event windows before and after the announcement day to capture any effect of a 
price run-up before the event, or a possible value readjustment after the announcement day. The daily 
abnormal return (AR) is calculated as the difference between the actual return and the expected return. The 
expected return is calculated using the market adjusted model, the market model, and the market model 
with adjusted beta (the estimated beta adjusted for mean reversion (Blume (1979)). We use the value-
                                               
3 Other proposed takeover characteristics that may affect the short-term value creation to the bidder are, e.g., value 
vs. growth (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994), Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003)); friendly vs. hostile 
(Goergen and Renneboog (2004)); tender offers vs. mergers (Rau and Vermaelen (1998)); target ownership 
structure (Högfeldt and Högholm (2000), Martynova and Renneboog (2008a); bidder toehold (Stulz, Walking 
and Song (1990), Hamza (2011)); investor protection (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2002), 
Goergen, Martynova and Renneboog (2005), Martynova and Renneboog (2008b)); partial acquisitions (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2002)); takeover waves (Martynova and Renneboog (2011)). 
4 The returns are continuously compounded returns. 
5 The event day (announcement day) is defined as the day when the information of the takeover was announced for 
the first time (or the day after if the announcement occurred after the closing of the trading day or on a non-
trading day).  
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weighted OMX Helsinki cap6 as a proxy for the market portfolio. To estimate the parameters in the market 
model we use a window of 241 days, starting 300 days and ending 60 days prior to the event day. Our 
estimates of the abnormal returns are robust with respect to the different choices of the estimation model of 
the expected returns. Changing the estimation model does not materially change the results, hence, in the 
remainder of the paper we only report the results using the market model in estimating the expected returns. 
To further study the market reaction to the takeover announcement, we regress the bidder’s short term 
abnormal return on several explanatory factors with respect to the characteristics of the acquisition. The 
key characteristics we use are the size and the relative size of the transaction, the origin of the target 
company, the legal status of the target company, the strategic scope of the transaction (focus or 
diversification), and the mean of payments.  
We study a sample of takeovers made by Finnish stock market listed companies during the time period 
from January 2000 to December 2013. The information about the acquisition is collected from the Thomson 
ONE Banker Database and corresponding stock exchange releases. There are a total of 1703 acquisitions 
during the time period where the bidder is publicly traded. We further restrict the sample to acquisitions 
where the bidder acquire a majority stake in the target (more than 50% ownership), leaving us with 1108 
observations. We also eliminate transactions that may be considered too small to yield an observable stock 
market reaction to the announcement. We set the transaction value limit to 10 million USD, leaving us with 
a final sample of 314 transactions.  
We collect information about the characteristics of the acquisition from the Thomson ONE Banker 
database, from stock exchange releases and from companies’ homepages. In several acquisitions, when the 
target firm is privately held, there is a lack of reliable information mostly regarding the term of payments. 
Some bidders disclose all the details about the bid, but since this is not mandatory for small transactions of 
privately held targets, there are bidders that do not disclose all details regarding the characteristics of the 
bid. 
Table 1 presents the total sample of 314 takeovers by deal characteristics over the time period January, 
2000 – December 2013. The takeover activity was largest in year 2000 (49 transactions) and in the years 
                                               
6 We use the restricted version of the market index (OMXHelsinki cap) which restricts the weight of any individual 
company to a maximum of ten percent in the index. This is due to the large weight of some companies in the 
unrestricted market index, e.g., the weight of Nokia was about 60 percent in the index in year 2000. 
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preceding the financial crises (2005-2007). The mean transaction value is 237 million USD (median 50 
million USD). Diversification was the dominant takeover strategy for the bidders in our sample. About 63 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics of takeovers in Finland.  
The table provides information about the characteristics of 314 takeovers with a Finnish acquirer that took place during the time period Jan 2000-Dec 2013. The 
table provides information about the distribution of takeovers over the sample period, and the distribution of the takeovers partitioned over different characteristics 
of the acquisition. Value is the value of the bid in million USD, diversification is when the target operates in a different industry than the bidder according to their 
industry classification (SIC-code), public target is a target company that is publicly traded, cross-border bid is a bid where the target company is of foreign origin, 
deals classified on the terms of payment (cash, equity, mixed bids and deals with undisclosed terms), and finally, if the bidder acquire 100% of the target or a 
smaller amount. 
 
Year  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total  
Total number  49 19 24 14 15 33 36 31 26 13 15 13 16 10 314 
% of all  15.61 % 6.05 % 7.64 % 4.46 % 4.78 % 10.51 % 11.46 % 9.87 % 8.28 % 4.14 % 4.78 % 4.14 % 5.10 % 3.18 % 100 % 
                
Value – avg. 317 467 163 63 165 208 122 367 247 260 113 139 262 278 237 
Value – max. 4940 3309 1135 186 1735 1482 1191 7954 3188 2404 1128 590 3735 2221 7954 
Value – min.  10 10 13 12 11 10 11 10 12 11 13 12 11 13 10 
                
Diversification  29 7 14 8 12 17 28 25 18 7 9 7 12 5 198 
% of all 59.18 % 36.84 % 58.33 % 57.14 % 80.00 % 51.52 % 77.78 % 80.65 % 69.23 % 53.85 % 60.00 % 53.85 % 75.00 % 50.00 % 63.06 % 
Non-diversification  20 12 10 6 3 16 8 6 8 6 6 6 4 5 116 
% of all 40.82 % 63.16 % 41.67 % 42.86 % 20.00 % 48.48 % 22.22 % 19.35 % 30.77 % 46.15 % 40.00 % 46.15 % 25.00 % 50.00 % 36.94 % 
                
Public target 11 4 6 2 1 5 6 7 4 4 0 1 0 0 51 
% of all 22.45 % 21.05 % 25.00 % 14.29 % 6.67 % 15.15 % 16.67 % 22.58 % 15.38 % 30.77 % 0.00 % 7.69 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 16.24 % 
Non-public target 38 15 18 12 14 28 30 24 22 9 15 12 16 10 263 




% 83.76 % 
                
Cross-border 31 12 15 8 9 20 20 18 24 7 8 10 11 5 198 
% of all 63.27 % 63.16 % 62.50 % 57.14 % 60.00 % 60.61 % 55.56 % 58.06 % 92.31 % 53.85 % 53.33 % 76.92 % 68.75 % 50.00 % 63.06 % 
Domestic 18 7 9 6 6 13 16 13 2 6 7 3 5 5 116 
% of all 36.73 % 36.84 % 37.50 % 42.86 % 40.00 % 39.39 % 44.44 % 41.94 % 7.69 % 46.15 % 46.67 % 23.08 % 31.25 % 50.00 % 36.94 % 
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Year  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total  
                
Cash only 10 4 7 3 2 15 10 11 12 5 4 5 6 1 95 
% of all 20.41 % 21.05 % 29.17 % 21.43 % 13.33 % 45.45 % 27.78 % 35.48 % 46.15 % 38.46 % 26.67 % 38.46 % 37.50 % 10.00 % 30.25 % 
Stock only 13 5 4 3 2 2 0 1 1 4 1 1 0 1 38 
% of all 26.53 % 26.32 % 16.67 % 21.43 % 13.33 % 6.06 % 0.00 % 3.23 % 3.85 % 30.77 % 6.67 % 7.69 % 0.00 % 10.00 % 12.10 % 
Combined  5 2 1 0 3 2 5 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 28 
% of all 10.20 % 10.53 % 4.17 % 0.00 % 20.00 % 6.06 % 13.89 % 6.45 % 3.85 % 7.69 % 6.67 % 15.38 % 12.50 % 10.00 % 8.92 % 
Unknown  21 8 12 8 8 14 21 17 12 3 9 5 8 7 153 
% of all 42.86 % 42.11 % 50.00 % 57.14 % 53.33 % 42.42 % 58.33 % 54.84 % 46.15 % 23.08 % 60.00 % 38.46 % 50.00 % 70.00 % 48.73 % 
                
100 % acquired 39 17 18 11 12 29 30 24 21 9 13 11 16 9 259 
% of all 79.59 % 89.47 % 75.00 % 78.57 % 80.00 % 87.88 % 83.33 % 77.42 % 80.77 % 69.23 % 86.67 % 84.62 % 100.00 % 90.00 % 82.48 % 
<100 % acquired 10 2 6 3 3 4 6 7 5 4 2 2 0 1 55 
% of all 20.41 % 10.53 % 25.00 % 21.43 % 20.00 % 12.12 % 16.67 % 22.58 % 19.23 % 30.77 % 13.33 % 15.38 % 0.00 % 10.00 % 17.52 % 
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percent of the bids were for a target company operating in a different industry than the bidder (according 
to their industry classification). A large proportion of the bids are for privately held target firms (84 percent). 
The relative number of cross-border bids is 63 percent, with year 2008 as an extreme year with 24 cross-
border bids out of a total of 26 bids during that year. This is consistent with the number of cross-border bids 
(60 percent) for a sample of 53 Finnish bidders during the time period 1993-2001 (Martynova and 
Renneboog (2011)). Most of the cross-border transactions are for target companies in Sweden (43 
transactions). A total of 38 acquisitions are made in countries with the highest shareholder protection (27 
transactions in the US and 11 transactions in the UK). The terms of payment are undisclosed in 153 
transactions (almost 49 percent). Of the bids for which the payment method is disclosed, the majority is 
cash bids (30 percent). Of the remaining bids, 38 are all equity bids (12 percent), while 28 bids (9 percent) 
are a mix of cash and equity. Only about 18 percent (55 transactions) of the bids were partial bids aiming 
for less than 100 % ownership.  
 
4. RESULTS 
In this section we first present the results from the univariate analysis of the bidder’s cumulative average 
abnormal return (CAAR) in takeover transactions in Finland during the time period from January 2000 to 
December 2013. Secondly, we analyze the determinants of the abnormal return to the takeover 
announcement. 
Table 2, Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for the abnormal return on the announcement day, the 
cumulative abnormal return for a seven day event window around the announcement day, and the size 
related variables used in the analysis. The table shows that the announcement of a takeover bid on average 
yields a positive abnormal return to the bidder’s shareholders on the announcement day (T = 0). Using the 
market model7, the average abnormal return (AAR) is about 1.40 percent on the event day. For a longer 
event windows, seven days centered at the announcement day, the cumulative average abnormal return 
(CAAR) increases to about 2.14 percent. We also document several extreme cases with both large positive 
and large negative abnormal returns. The mean transaction value is about 237 million USD (median 50 
million), while the relative transaction value (transaction value to the size of the bidder) is about 0.29 
                                               
7 We choose to only report the results using the market model to calculate the abnormal return. Our results are robust 
to the choice of estimation model of the benchmark returns. The results using the market adjusted model or the 
market model with adjusted beta are available upon request. 
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(median 0.06). Table 2, Panel B shows the correlation between the variables. There seems to be a negative 
relationship between the announcement effect and the transaction value. An opposite relationship is evident 
between the announcement effect and the relative deal value, measured as the value of the transaction to 
the value of the bidder prior to the announcement. 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics for 314 takeover transactions 
Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for 314 takeover transactions during the time period Jan 2000-Dec 2013. The 
average abnormal return (AAR) and the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) for a seven day event window 
is calculated using the market model to estimate the expected return. The market return is calculated using the value-
weighted total return index OMX Helsinki cap. The market model parameters are estimated over a period of 241 days 
starting 300 days before the announcement. TV is the transaction value of the deal in million USD, Relative TV is the 
relative transaction value of the deal to the value of the bidder. Panel B of Table 2 presents the correlation between 
the variables. Statistical significance is denoted by */**/*** (10%/5%/1%). 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics     
  AAR (%) CAAR (%) TV Relative TV 
Mean 1.40 2.14 237.38 0.29 
Median 1.00 2.00 50.68 0.06 
Min -19.84 -29.43 10.04 0.00 
Max 69.13 50.96 7953.59 14.07 
Std dev 6.02 7.47 702.92 1.01 
     
Panel B: Correlation       
 AAR CAAR LOG(TV) Relative DV 
AAR 1 0.597*** -0.127** 0.591*** 
CAR  1 -0.100* 0.418*** 
LOG(TV)   1 0.023 
Relative TV    1 
 
Table 3 reports the cumulative abnormal return around the announcement for different event windows 
ranging from 20 days before to 20 days after the takeover announcement. We document a statistically 
significant cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) of about 2 percent for all event windows centered 
at the announcement day. This result is comparable to the result (CAAR of 2.16 percent for an eleven day 
event window) reported in Martynova and Renneboog (2011) for a sample of Finnish bidders during the 
time period 1993-2001. 
We do not document any evidence of a price run-up in the pre-event period (20 days to 1 day before the 
announcement). None of the pre-event windows exhibits a significant CAAR. We do, however, see 
indications of a delayed market reaction to the announcement with a positive CAAR of 0.57 percent in the 
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event window one day to three days after the announcement. For the longer post-event windows the CAARs 
are not statistically significant, although there seems to be some price reversal in the longest event window, 
mainly from days 14 to 20, as is also evident from Figure 1. 
 
Table 3 Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the bidding firms 
The table reports cumulative average abnormal returns for the bidding firms in 314 takeover transactions during the 
time period Jan 2000-Dec 2013 over different event windows. The expected return is calculated using the market 
model. The market return is calculated using the value-weighted total return index OMX Helsinki cap. Statistical 
significance is denoted by */**/*** (10%/5%/1%).  
    Market adjusted model   
Event window  (%) (p-value) Max (%) Min (%)  
[-20. +20] 1.973*** 0.009 64.54 -45.29  
[-10. +10] 2.083*** 0.001 66.33 -46.76  
[-5. +5] 2.207*** 0.000 54.22 -27.74  
[-3. +3] 2.140*** 0.000 50.96 -29.43  
[-1. +1] 1.888*** 0.000 67.25 -23.61  
[T=0] 1.398*** 0.000 69.13 -19.84  
      
[-20. -1] 0.516 0.366 68.79 -32.64  
[-10. -1] 0.231 0.574 36.51 -26.03  
[-5. -1] 0.306 0.346 39.17 -24.58  
[-3. -1] 0.196 0.467 37.13 -25.86  
      
[+1. +20] 0.060 0.909 52.81 -35.32  
[+1. +10] 0.453 0.291 21.67 -45.80  
[+1. +5] 0.502 0.142 20.65 -34.74  
[+1. +3] 0.566** 0.030 15.17 -22.35   
 
 
Overall, the results show that short term bidder returns are positive and statistically significant. The returns 
accumulate mostly during a seven day event window centered at the event day, with the majority of the 
market reaction to the bid occurring at the announcement day. Hence, the announcement is on average a 
value creating event for the bidder’s shareholders, indicating that the main motive for the transaction is to 
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create value to the shareholders.8 This is also evident from Table 4, in which we report the number of 
announcements that yields a positive and a negative market reaction, respectively. Out of the 314 
announcements, 202 had a positive abnormal return on the announcement day. However, we cannot rule 
out that some of the acquisitions are driven by hubris or agency motives, since 112 announcements yielded 




Figure 1 The cumulative abnormal return (CAARs) for the bidding firms. 
The figure shows the cumulative average abnormal return for the bidding firm in 314 takeover transactions in Finland 
during the time period Jan 2000-Dec 2013 for an event window of 41 days. The abnormal return is calculated using 
the market model. The market return is based on the value-weighted total return index OMX Helsinki Cap. The market 





Table 4 Number of positive and negative stock market reactions 
The table reports the number of events with positive and negative abnormal returns in 314 takeover transactions in 
Finland during the time period Jan 2000-Dec 2013. The abnormal returns are calculated using the market model, where 
the market return is based on the value-weighted total return index OMX Helsinki cap. 
                Event day [T=0]             CAR [-3,+3] 
     Number        %     Number        % 
 
Positive  202 64.3  205 65.3 
                                               
8 In addition, the average abnormal return for the sample of publicly traded target firms was 38.4 percent on the 
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Negative  112 35.7  109 34.7 
Total  314 100  314 100 
 
Our results are robust to the choice of estimation model of the benchmark returns and to the length of the 
event window. In the remainder of the paper we report the results on the announcement day and for an event 
window of seven days centered at the announcement day using the market model returns as the benchmark 
returns. Using a longer event window and/or the two alternative estimation models does not materially 
change the results.9 
Table 5 Average abnormal (AAR) and cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) for the bidding firm by different 
characteristics of the acquisition 
The table reports the average abnormal return and the cumulative average abnormal returns for the bidding firm in 
314 takeover transactions in Finland during the time period Jan 2000-Dec 2013 over a seven day event window and 
for different characteristics of the acquisition. The abnormal returns are calculated using the market model, where the 
market return is based on the value-weighted total return index OMX Helsinki cap. The acquisition characteristics are 
the size of the bid, the origin of the target company (cross-border or domestic), the bid being for a publicly traded or 
privately held company, the bid being for a company within the same industry or for an unrelated company (based 
upon the SIC-code), the terms of payment; cash or equity, and the bid being non-partial or not. Statistical significance 
are denoted by */**/*** (10%/5%/1%). 
AAR [t=0]   CAAR [-3:3]  
  (%) (p-value) Nobs     (%) (p-value) Nobs 
Whole sample 1.40 %*** 0.00 314  Whole sample 2.14 %*** 0.00 314 
         
Large transactions  0.83 %** 0.02 157  Large transactions  2.04 %*** 0.00 157 
Small transactions 1.97 %*** 0.00 157  Small transactions 2.28 %*** 0.00 157 
Difference -1.14 %* 0.09   Difference -0.24 % 0.78  
         
Cross border 0.80 %*** 0.01 198  Cross border 1.51 %*** 0.00 198 
Domestic 2.42 %*** 0.00 116  Domestic 3.26 %*** 0.00 116 
Difference -1.62 %** 0.02   Difference -1.75 %** 0.04  
         
US/UK target 1.74 %** 0.04 38  US/UK target 3.05 %** 0.03 38 
Other 1.33 %*** 0.00 276  Other 2.02 %*** 0.00 276 
Difference  0.41 % 0.69   Difference    1.03 % 0.46  
Diversification  1.80 %*** 0.00 198  Diversification  2.55 %*** 0.00 198 
Non-diversification  0.71 %* 0.06 116  Non-diversification  1.49 %** 0.03 116 
Difference 1.09 % 0.12   Difference 1.06 % 0.22  
         
Public target 0.63 % 0.43 51  Public target 0.87 % 0.43 51 
                                               
9 The results for alternative event windows and using the market adjusted model or the market model with adjusted 
beta are available upon request. 
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Non-public target 1.55 %*** 0.00 263  Non-public target 2.41 %*** 0.00 263 
Difference -0.92 % 0.32   Difference -1.54 % 0.18  
         
Cash only 1.19 %*** 0.00 95  Cash only 2.50 %*** 0.00 95 
Other payments 1.49 %*** 0.00 219  Other payments 2.01 %*** 0.00 219 
Difference -0.29 % 0.69   Difference 0.49 % 0.59  
         
Stock only 3.96 %* 0.08 38  Stock only 4.11 %* 0.07 38 
Other payments 1.05 %*** 0.00 276  Other payments 1.89 %*** 0.00 276 
Difference 2.91 %*** 0.00   Difference 2.22 %*** 0.00  
         
100 % acquired 1.59 %*** 0.00 259  100 % acquired 2.27 %*** 0.00 259 
Less acquired 0.51 % 0.46 55  Less acquired 1.65 %** 0.04 55 
Difference 1.08 % 0.23    Difference 0.62 % 0.58  
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Table 5 reports the market reaction to takeover announcements by deal characteristics. Both large (above 
median) and small transactions yield a statistically significant abnormal return on the announcement day as 
well as during the seven day event window. However, large transactions, defined as transactions larger than 
the median transaction value, seem to yield a lower positive announcement reaction than small transactions 
on the event day (0.83 versus 1.97 percent). The difference is statistically significant (prob-value 0.09). The 
difference is, however, insignificant between the two groups during the seven day event window. 
Most of the bids made by Finnish bidders are for a foreign target company. Overall, the bidder experience 
a positive announcement effect for both cross-border and domestic bids, but the announcement effect is 
significantly lower for bidders engaging in cross-border transactions (0.80 versus 2.42 percent). The same 
difference is also found in the seven day event window. Bidders making acquisitions in the US or in the 
UK have a higher announcement effect, and the measured stock market reaction to this type of acquisition 
is close to the reaction for a domestic acquisition. 
Most of the acquisitions made by Finnish bidders are for a target company operating in an unrelated 
industry, i.e., a diversification takeover. In contrast to our expectations, the announcement of a 
diversification takeover yields a higher return than an announcement of a related takeover (1.80 versus 0.71 
percent on the event day, 2.55 versus 1.49 percent during the seven day event window). The difference is, 
however, not significant on conventional significance levels. 
The announcement of an acquisition of a private target yields a statistically significant abnormal return of 
1.55 percent, whereas the announcement of an acquisition of a public target yields a small positive 
(insignificant) return of 0.63 percent. The same is evident for the seven day event window, i.e., a significant 
abnormal return in an acquisition of a private target and an insignificant abnormal return in an acquisition 
of a public target. 
We document a statistically significant difference in the announcement effect of stock only versus other 
types of bids. The announcement effect is significantly higher for stock only bids at the announcement day 
(3.96 versus 1.05 percent).. Contrary to our expectations there is no difference in the announcement effect 
of cash versus non-cash bids, but a statistically significant higher announcement effect for all equity bids 
versus other bids. The results may, though, be affected by the fact that in almost 49 percent of the bids the 
terms of payment is not disclosed, hence, there may be quite a large number of acquisitions that are 
misclassified. 
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Finally, in Table 5, we also report the announcement effect for non-partial versus partial bids. The market 
response to the announcement is on average slightly positive to both acquisition types, and no significant 
difference in the response can be detected. 
The univariate tests show that there is a difference in the market response to an announcement based upon 
the characteristics of the bid. In Table 6 we report the results from an OLS-regression of the market reaction 
using the bid characteristics as explanatory variables. We also add a control variable to the regression, 
capturing the effect of the sixth takeover wave. For example, Jensen (2004) and Moeller et al. (2005) argue 
that there is a positive correlation between the sentiment on the stock market and takeover activity, and that 
bidders in times of high stock market valuation tend to bid more aggressively and, hence, increase the bid 
premium. As a consequence, the gain that accrues to the bidder’s shareholders decreases. Alexandridis, 
Mavrovitis and Travlos (2012) defined the sixth takeover wave as the time period between June 2003 and 
December 2007. However, in Finland the activity on the takeover market did not increase until the 
beginning of 2005. The increased activity continued until the end of year 2008. To control for a potential 
effect of this increased activity, we define the sixth takeover wave as the time period between January 2005 
and December 2008, and include a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the takeover is announced during 
that time period. A total of 126 announcements were recorded during this time period. 
In the analysis of the market response on the announcement day we see that most of the results from the 
regression analysis are consistent with the findings in the univariate analysis. Looking at the full model in 
Table 6, we see that there is a significant negative relationship between the bidder’s abnormal return and 
the size of the deal, indicating that the market expect that the bidding firm may face large post-acquisition 
integration costs which will reduce the takeover synergy (Martynova and Renneboog (2011)), or that the 
acquisition is mainly driven by agency motives or by over optimism. However, looking at the relative size 
of deal to the value of the bidder we document a statistically significant positive relationship. Hence, the 
results suggest that the larger the deal is to the value of the bidder, the more likely it is that the transaction 
is driven by value creation, and that the bidder’s shareholders also capture some part of this gain.  
Lower bidder announcement returns are observed for cross-border acquisitions, relative to domestic 
acquisitions (significant in the seven day event window). The results are consistent with findings reported 
in Conn et al. (2005) and in Moeller and Schlingemann (2005), indicating that the bidding firm may have 
difficulties in the post-takeover process to utilize the perceived synergies. However, if the target company 
is from the US or the UK we observe a statistically significant larger announcement effect.
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Table 6 Determinants of the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
The table reports the results of the OLS regression of the cumulative abnormal return for the bidders in 314 takeover transactions in Finland during the time period 
Jan 2000-Dec 2013. LOG(Transaction value) is the value of the bid in million USD, relative deal value is the relative value of the deal to the value of the bidder, 
cross-border is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the target company is of foreign origin, USUK target is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the 
target company is from the US or the UK, public target is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the target company is publicly traded, diversification is a 
dummy variable taking the value 1 when the target operates in a different industry than the bidder according to their industry classification (SIC-code), acquiring 
100 % of shares is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the bidder acquires all shares, cash only is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the acquisition 
is paid for in cash, stock only is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the acquisition is paid for in stock and sixth wave is a dummy variable taking the value 
1 if the acquisition takes place during the time period January 2005 to December 2008. All regressions contain White’s heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. 
Statistical significance are denoted by */**/*** (10%/5%/1%). 
 AR [0]  CAR [-3:3] 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent variable  coeff. p-value   coeff. p-value   coeff. p-value   coeff. p-value   coeff. p-value   coeff. p-value 
Intercept 0.010 0.27  0.012 0.23  0.019*** 0.00  0.025* 0.05  0.029** 0.03  0.029*** 0.00 
LOG(Transaction value)  -0.006*** 0.01  -0.006*** 0.01  -0.006*** 0.01  -0.005 0.13  -0.005 0.14  -0.006* 0.09 
Relative deal value 0.035*** 0.00  0.035*** 0.00  0.036*** 0.00  0.031*** 0.00  0.031*** 0.00  0.031*** 0.00 
Cross-border -0.009 0.16  -0.009 0.17  -0.009 0.18  -0.015* 0.06  -0.013* 0.09  -0.015* 0.07 
USUK target 0.015* 0.05  0.014* 0.05  0.015* 0.07  0.023* 0.06  0.023** 0.04  0.028* 0.07 
Public target -0.003 0.70  -0.003 0.70     -0.013 0.28  -0.011 0.35    
Diversification  0.008 0.16  0.009 0.14     0.009 0.24  0.008 0.26    
Acquiring 100 % of shares 0.002 0.80  0.002 0.82     -0.004 0.65  -0.005 0.58    
Cash only 0.002 0.68     0.001 0.78  0.011 0.19     0.009 0.28 
Stock only  -0.025 0.86     -0.004 0.74  -0.003 0.85     -0.007 0.68 
Sixth wave 0.004 0.46        0.001 0.84       
                  
F-stat. 18.84*** 0.00  26.99*** 0.00  30.99*** 0.00  8.05*** 0.00  11.22*** 0.00  13.06*** 0.00 
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Adjusted R² 0.363   0.368   0.365   0.184   0.186   0.188  
Number of acquisitions 314     314     314     314     314     314   
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There are indications of the market perceiving diversification announcements to be good news, rewarding 
the bid with a higher positive (not significant) abnormal return than a corresponding announcement of a 
focused acquisition. Hence, the investors consider the positive effect of risk reduction being larger than the 
negative effect of the agency problem.  
In the univariate analysis there were some indications of a lower bidder abnormal return when the target 
company is publicly listed. We also documented a positive announcement effect for stock only bids versus 
other types of bids. However, in the multivariate setting these differences disappear, indicating that the 
results may be driven by size related issues instead. There is no difference in the announcement effect 
whether the bidder acquire 100 percent of the target or a smaller amount. The control variable for the sixth 
takeover wave is also insignificant. 
Finally, in Table 6, we also report the results from different specifications of the model. In model 
specification two we exclude the term of payments variables and the takeover wave dummy, and in 
specification three we exclude the public target, diversification, non-partial and the takeover wave dummy. 
The alternative specifications do not change the estimated coefficients for the size related variables or the 
target origin related variables. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, we analyze the short term market reactions to takeover announcements in a sample of 314 
acquisitions made by a stock market listed Finnish company during the time period from January 2000 to 
December 2013. The acquisitions of Finnish companies during the studied period were characterized by a 
diversification strategy involving a foreign target company. The acquisition was typically friendly, and 
aimed for the entire capital of the target company. We document, on average, a significant positive stock 
market reaction to the announcement. The announcement effect is statistically significant yielding an 
average abnormal return of 1.4 percent on the announcement day. This result is consistent with the 
assumption that most of the acquisitions are motivated by synergy. Neither the pre-event nor the post-event 
abnormal returns are statistically significant, although there is sign of a negative price revaluation in the 
post-event period. 
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We also investigate the relationship between the market reaction to the announcement and deal 
characteristics. We document a significant, negative relationship between deal size and the abnormal return 
on the announcement day. However, looking at the size of the deal in relation to the size of the bidder we 
find a reversed relationship, i.e., the larger the relative size of the deal, the more positive the announcement 
effect. The market reaction is more favorable to an acquisition of a domestic target company, indicating 
that the market believes that the acquirer may face substantial post-acquisition integration costs in cross-
border transactions. If the target company is from the US or from the UK the negative cross-border effect 
is smaller. We also document that an acquisition motivated by diversification may yield a higher abnormal 
return to the bidder shareholders than an acquisition of a target firm within the same industry. Hence, the 
decrease in the financial risk seems to be more important than a potential increase in the agency costs. We 
do not find any significant relationship between the announcement effect and legal status of the target, the 
terms of payment, full acquisition of the target, or the sixth takeover wave. 
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